New Approach of Assessing Human Errors in Railways by Hadj-Mabrouk, Habib
Transactions of the VSB - Technical university of Ostrava
Safety Engineering Series, ISSN 1805-3238 
Vol. XIII, No. 2, 2018
1
NEW APPROACH OF ASSESSING HUMAN ERRORS IN RAILWAYS
Habib HADJ-MABROUK1 
1 French institute of science and technology of transport, spatial planning, development and networks, Marne 
la Vallée, France, habib.hadj-mabrouk@ifsttar.fr
Abstract: Inspired in particular by the works of Reason and Rasmussen and supported by application 
examples from the fi eld of railway safety, the human error analysis approach proposed to 
improve the level of safety of rail transport systems involves three complementary levels. 
The fi rst level of contextual analysis (before the accident) makes it possible to study 
the various factors favoring the production of the human error at the origin of the accident. 
The second cognitive level (during the accident) aims to identify the errors related to 
the human cognitive process involved in a given situation of insecurity. The third level 
of behavioral analysis (after the accident) focuses on evaluating the consequences of 
a wrong action in terms of damage to humans, the environment and the human-machine 
system. This article proposes an original methodological framework for the analysis, 
classifi cation and evaluation of human errors involved in the safety of rail transport. 
The key factors taken into account in the analysis concern not only the inappropriate 
behavior of human operators involved in railway safety and risk management, but 
also the technical failures of the transport system and the operating and environmental 
conditions.
Keywords: Rail safety; Human error; Feedback of experience; Incident investigation; Human error 
classifi cation.
Research article
Introduction
The adverse consequences and the considerable 
cost of accidents due to the human factor, 
the occurrence of new disasters despite the progress 
of technology, are at the basis of the establishment of 
a system of feedback of experience (REX) as being 
the an essential means of promoting the necessary 
improvement of safety. The main objective of 
this system is to learn from an experience lived 
to avoid its reproduction. With the improvement 
of the technical reliability, the current trend is to 
attribute the malfunctions of the systems, generators 
of accidents, to an error of the human operator. 
The operator is considered as weak point of 
the system and limiter of performance and safety. 
Thus, human error constitutes a major causal 
factor for the emergence of accidents in several 
safety sectors, including rail transport. The REX 
consists of analyzing the circumstances leading to 
the occurrence of unintended adverse events. It is 
a dynamic process of collecting, storing, analyzing 
and using data related to unhealthy situations. 
Its objective is to benefi t from the lessons learned 
to improve the level of safety by implementing 
the appropriate preventive and corrective measures 
in order to avoid the reproduction of such a risk-
bearing situation. Other work focuses on the Rex 
as a decision support process. It allows providing 
the right knowledge at the right time and at the right 
level so that the operator responsible for safety can 
make the right decision. Its purpose is to provide actors 
with the knowledge they need to make decisions. 
The REX consists, then, in the management of 
the knowledge coming from a positive and 
/ or negative event making it possible to take 
the appropriate decisions in situations of the same 
nature in the future. Some authors consider that REX 
is a learning process. In the face of a risky situation, 
the REX, as a process of acquiring knowledge and 
learning, not only allows to identify knowledge, but 
also to share it among the actors concerned. This is 
an approach that aims to highlight the shortcomings, 
dysfunctions and incompatibilities of the safety 
system and to formulate proposals that can avoid 
such situations or reduce the consequences. It is 
a detailed study and an in-depth analysis of signifi cant 
accidents or incidents for a better knowledge of their 
generating mechanisms. The REX is essential for 
detecting unpredictable events, especially during 
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the design and commissioning of the system. 
The aim is twofold, it's not just about learning 
lessons for effective, short-term safety-related 
remedies, but also to capitalize and evolve the deep 
knowledge of human and material behaviors in 
the medium term. Broadly speaking, the purpose 
of the REX is to manage information from an 
event, including the collection and storage of data, 
the processing and analysis of such data, the actual 
use of the results obtained and their transmission 
to share information experience. Nevertheless, 
the current the REX system faces several obstacles 
and limitations, the most important of which are 
problems related to the analysis of human factors. 
It is generally defi cient and remains limited to 
a technical dimension. Even if the methods currently 
available are satisfactory and have been proven 
to analyze and exploit technological incidents, 
this is not the case for incidents involving human 
failure. The REX is much less effi cient and much 
more limited when it concerns the human factor 
aspect and operational events directly or indirectly 
involving human intervention. For a deeper analysis 
of the REX, the reader can refer to the following 
works: (Joing and Keravel, 1993; Wibaux, 1995; 
Quatre, 1999; Amalberti and Barriquault, 1999; 
Gilbert, 2001; Hadj-Mabrouk, 2003, 2016). 
In the rail transport sector, safety is a key concern 
for transport system operators and for national, 
European and international authorities. Whatever 
the mode of transport (land, sea or air), the transport 
sector is an activity that constantly involves serious 
risks on the one hand because of the speed related to 
the movement of vehicles, and on the other hand, for 
public transport which generates internal risks for 
travelers and external risks for third parties, residents 
living near infrastructures and for the environment. 
However, the importance of human factors aspects 
in achieving safety objectives is unanimously 
accepted by all actors (infrastructure manager, railway 
undertaking, national safety authority, technical 
survey bodies, European Agency for safety of 
the railroads) during the phases of design, realization, 
validation, homologation, certifi cation, authorization 
of start-up, maintenance and feedback of experience 
(Rex) after accidents or incidents. Beyond this 
recognition in principle, it is clear that taking into 
account these human factors is still perfectible. They 
are not formally and systematically integrated into 
the practices of industrialists in the railway sector. 
Whether in the industrial fi eld or in the transport 
sector, the human factors approaches implemented 
is not very experienced, or even rarely understood. 
One of the diffi culties lies in the multitude of 
ways of understanding the human factors aspects 
in particular the defi nition of the methods and 
the work tasks entrusted to the human operator, 
the precise determination of the limits of the latter, 
the design of interfaces adequate men-machines and 
the mastery of new knowledge relating to the human 
and social sciences (ergonomics, psychology, 
sociology ...). Various disciplines have addressed 
the issue, giving rise to multiple concepts, models, 
and methods (De-keyser, 1982; Norman, 1983; 
Swain and Guttmann, 1983; Leplat, 1989; Cellier, 
1990; Fadier, 1994; Salminen and Tallberg, 1996; 
Amalberti, 2001). Despite the undeniable interest 
of these approaches, their implementation in 
the fi eld of rail transport safety, and in particular 
in the feedback of experience (Rex) process, remains 
diffi cult and sometimes impossible. In order to 
provide an element of answer, this article proposes 
an approach of integration of the human factors 
in the Rex process making it possible to appreciably 
improve the level of safety of the rail transport 
systems. This contribution is organized around three 
levels of hierarchical analysis:
- The fi rst level of "contextual" analysis (before 
the accident) makes it possible to study the various 
factors favoring the production of the human error 
at the origin of the accident;
- The second "cognitive" level (during the accident) 
aims to identify errors related to the human 
cognitive process involved in a given situation of 
insecurity;
- The third level of behavioral analysis (after 
the accident) focuses on assessing the consequences 
of a bad action in terms of damage to humans, 
the environment and the human-machine system.
Regulatory context of the study
The work presented in this paper is part of 
the scientifi c policy of our Institute IFSTTAR (French 
institute of science and technology of transport) and 
especially in our initial research problematic, that is 
to say the analysis and the evaluation of the safety of 
rail transport, and in its indispensable extension to 
the consideration of human factors in the fi eld 
of safety. The lack of links between these two 
disciplines and their complementarities has been 
deplored many times, including by our guardianships. 
Taking into account the impact of human factors is 
also recommended by Directive (EU) 2016/798 of 
the European parliament and of the council of 11 
may 2016 on railway safety (Directive / EU 2016): 
"The Safety Management System (SMS) should, 
through its processes, help to ensure that human 
capabilities and limitations, as well as infl uences on 
human performance, are taken into account through 
the application of factor knowledge humans and 
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the use of recognized methods". Indeed, according 
to this new European directive n° 2016/798, and 
in the case where the direct cause of an accident 
or an incident seems linked to human actions, 
"it is necessary to pay attention to the particular 
circumstances of the manner in which normal 
operations are carried out by staff in the normal 
course of operation, including the design of 
the Human-Machine Interface, the appropriateness 
of the procedures, the confl ict of objectives, 
the workload, as well as all the other circumstances 
that infl uenced the event, including physical stress 
and stress related to work, fatigue or psychological 
fi tness".
Human error
The notion of human error is a very broad 
concept because it has multiple dimensions. 
Currently, there is no "common repository" to 
defi ne human error. Indeed, the term human error 
covers several meanings depending on the angle 
at which it is analyzed. This diversity of points of 
view is linked to the multiplicity of disciplines that 
analyze it (psychology, ergonomics, engineering, 
sociology, philosophy, law). Generally, the various 
defi nitions of human error adopted by researchers 
and specialists in the fi eld fall into three categories: 
(a) that which emphasizes the manifestations of 
errors (industrial approach), b) the one that is based 
on their modes of production (psycho-cognitive 
approach) and (c) the one that combines the two 
principles (psychodynamic approach to work). 
Human error is thus analyzed according to its 
negative aspect in terms of the consequences on man, 
on the system and its environment, or on its positive 
aspect by examining the mechanisms that explain its 
production. However, in almost all industrial sectors 
at risk and in particular in rail transport, human 
error has long been identifi ed as the fi rst factor 
contributing to the occurrence of rail accidents 
and incidents. Indeed, statistics show that human 
error is responsible for 70 to 90% of incidents and 
human operators were then designated as the cause 
of these accidents or incidents. However, instead 
of blaming the human operator who is often faced 
with an increasingly complex system and ignoring 
the latent conditions of these systems, human error 
must now be understood as the result of poor human 
reliability that depends on several performance 
factors and in particular organizational, professional 
and individual factors that all interact to infl uence 
human reliability. Human error is often only 
the impossibility in which an operator has to deal 
with an abnormal situation, be it the failure of 
a device or an unexpected set of circumstances: 
organizational, procedural, environmental change 
or even alteration of inter-individual relationships. 
Inherent in all human intervention, human error is 
a symptom of poor work organization, inadequate 
or inadequate training. By understanding it and 
managing it, it can become paradoxically a safety 
element. Our research work is part of this problematic 
and seeks to provide elements of answers to this vast 
problem of taking human factors into account in 
the feedback of experience with a view to improving 
risk management methods consequently the safety 
of rail transport. 
The Human Factors Analysis and 
Classifi cation System: HFACS
The Human Factors Analysis and Classifi cation 
System (HFACS) provide a methodological 
framework for analyzing and classifying human 
errors involved in accidents and incidents. Based on 
James Reason's "Swiss Cheese" human error model 
(Reason, 1990), the HFACS system is structured 
around four levels of hierarchical analysis of active 
failures and latent (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003):
1. Unsafe acts: Skill-Based Errors (e.g., a lack of 
attention), Decision Errors (e.g. inappropriate 
procedure, rule-based error), Perceptual Errors 
(e.g. when a decision is made based on erroneous 
information), Routine Violations and Exceptional 
Violations;
2. Preconditions for unsafe acts: Physical 
Environment (e.g. heat, vibration, lighting), 
Technological Environment (e.g. poor design 
of equipment and controls, human-machine 
interfaces), Adverse Mental State (for example, 
stress, mental fatigue, motivation), Adverse 
Physiological State (e.g. illness, physical fatigue, 
hypo vigilance), Physical / Mental Limitation 
(e.g. visual limitations, insuffi cient reaction time), 
Crew Resource Management (e.g. communication, 
coordination) and Personal Readiness (e.g. alcohol 
consumption or pharmaceuticals);
3. Hazardous supervision: Inadequate Supervision, 
Plan Inappropriate Operation, Fail to Correct 
Known Problem and Supervisory Violation (for 
example, improper application of procedures and 
regulations);
4. Organizational or cultural infl uences: Resource 
Management, Organizational Climate and 
Operational Process.
At each level of this organizational hierarchy 
of human failure, the HFACS approach makes 
it possible to analyze and identify the different 
types and categories of human error (i.e. a total of 
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in the CCP are often related to failure the berthing 
procedures, initialization, evacuation or driving 
procedures. Secondly, we identify the main factors 
that affect human performance and consequently, 
directly or indirectly infl uence the cognitive process 
of the operator during his activity. Several factors 
have been identifi ed as physical, physiological, 
psychological, social, chronobiological, behavioral, 
professional, chronobiological and factors related 
to psychosocial risks. These factors can be grouped 
into three broad categories: 1) Individual factors 
that include personality, experience, competence, 
mood, mental and psychological ability, physical 
ability, and individual health factors such as 
fatigue, alertness, attention, stress, drugs and 
alcohol, 2) Work factors that include the physical 
work environment, working conditions, confl icts 
of professional or personal values, autonomy and 
room for maneuver, the human-machine interface, 
the ergonomics of the workstation , the workload, 
the availability and quality of information and 
procedures, the equipment used, the requirements 
of the task and 3) Organizational factors include 
organizational priorities, corporate culture, 
availability of resources, communication systems, 
social relations, workplace relationships, leadership 
behavior, performance indicators and economic 
insecurity such as the change of an uncontrolled 
task, the confl ict or the risk of losing one's job. 
These individual, professional and organizational 
factors are closely linked and interact together to 
infl uence human reliability. After having identifi ed 
all the factors related to the Man (individual 
factors, work factors and organizational factors), it 
is then necessary to search, for each equipment of 
the system, the list of the potential human errors. 
The result of this study allows the designer to take 
into account, from the fi rst development phase of 
the system (specifi cation and design), all the potential 
human errors relating to each category of equipment 
that are likely to compromise the overall safety 
of the system. The goal is to integrate, right from 
the specifi cation and design phases of the system, 
the appropriate measures to catch, tolerate, reduce 
or eliminate certain human errors. After analyzing 
the different human factors related to humans and 
the system, it is also necessary to identify the various 
environmental factors likely to infl uence the good 
progress of the human activity and in particular 
the execution of the prescribed task. Identifying these 
environmental factors, from the design phase of 
the system, makes it possible to design and implement 
appropriate preventive ergonomic measures. Finally, 
during this fi rst phase of contextual analysis of 
human error, it is essential to identify the various 
interaction factors between humans, the system and 
19 categories of causality). Initially designed for 
military aviation accident investigations and analysis, 
the HFACS system has proven to be effective 
in identifying and analyzing human errors in several 
areas such as civil aviation, traffi c maritime, medical 
services, coal mines and the railway sector. In 
the fi eld of rail transport safety, we can mention 
the work of (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2006; 
Reinach and Viale, 2006; SanKim and ChulYoon, 
2013; Ergai et al. 2016; Madigan et al., 2016; Zhan 
et al., 2017; Fu,G. et al., 2017; Punzet et al., 2018; 
Zhou and Lei, 2018). Our study can be part of 
the HFACS system, but with several improvements 
and extensions needed to more accurately account 
for human factors in the feedback of experience after 
an accident or a rail incident.
Materials and methods
Contextual analysis
It should be recalled that the main objective of 
the study is to systematically take human factors into 
account in railway safety studies in accordance with 
Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of Europe may 2016 on railway 
safety. To achieve this objective and consequently to 
reduce the incidence of rail accidents and incidents, 
we have examined the various factors favoring 
the production of human error and in particular 
the human operator, his working environment, 
the transport system as well as the various 
interactions of the human operator with the system 
and the environment (internal and external). In order 
to demonstrate the feasibility and the validity of this 
new approach, we have used some real examples 
from the fi eld of railway safety and in particular 
the TGV-Nord high-speed system, the driverless 
metro type ALV (Automatic Light Vehicle), 
the Maggaly system from Lyon and the Transmanche 
Fixed Link system. This study therefore requires 
the study of the three main components of a socio-
technical system (Man, System, and Environment) 
as well as their interactions. As a fi rst step, we have 
identifi ed the different types of human operators 
involved in the safety of rail transport. We focused 
the study solely on two human operators most 
involved in the management of rail accident risks: 
the operator of the centralized command post 
(CCP) and the train driver. The potential errors of 
the driving operator are generally divided into two 
major classes: non-compliance with the signaling 
(crossing of the stop signal, non-compliance with 
the lights) and the error of control or maneuvering 
(e.g. untimely braking).  Potential operator errors 
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The second stage of analysis consists of studying 
the cognitive process implemented in a given 
situation and thus answers the question how? 
(During the accident). This approach often 
leads to action in terms of accomplishing a task. 
The last phase (downstream of the accident) studies 
the consequences of a wrong action in terms of 
damage to man, the environment and the system 
and thus answers the question what? Thus, through 
the fi rst two stages of the proposed approach, one 
can identify the different types of potential human 
errors as well as their possible interactions. It is 
for this reason that the proposed approach will 
focus solely on the fi rst two phases of analysis to 
determine the various factors involved in producing 
the potential human errors at the origin of the accident. 
The objective is to take into account all of these 
factors in the data collection phase after an accident 
or railway incident (feedback of experience: Rex).
Fig. 1. Articulation of the main levels involved 
in the analysis of human error in the accident
Before the accident (Contextual analysis)
The contextual analysis of human error, prior 
to the accident, consists in studying the different 
working conditions (characteristics of the situation, 
characteristics of the task ...) favoring its production. 
Considering the human operator in his work 
the internal and external environment of work. For 
example, the analysis of the interactions between 
the operator and the system allows the ergonomist 
designer to take into consideration the problems 
related to the characteristics of the work (load, 
position, schedules), to those of the prescribed task 
(number, duration, time, strength, knowledge ...) and 
those of the Human Machine Interface.
Cognitive analysis
Taking into account the fi rst contextual analysis 
mentioned above, the cognitive analysis of human 
error consists in studying the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in the production of the error at the origin 
of the accident. As part of this study, and in order 
to tend towards the completeness of the analysis, 
we have agreed to classify human errors along two 
complementary lines of investigation. In accordance 
with the work of Reason (Reason, 1990) by 
Rasmussen (Rasmussen, 1980, 1982, 1986, 1987, 
1990) and Rousse (Rouse, 1983), human errors can 
be classifi ed in two different and complementary 
ways: 1) either by referring to the three hierarchical 
levels of human activity (skill-based, rule-based 
or knowledge-based) or 2) in the different stages 
of information processing human reasoning or 
decision-making.
Application: approach of integration 
of the human error in the feedback 
of experience
The method we propose (Fig. 1) is inspired 
by the work of Reason (Reason, 1990), which 
evokes three levels of classifi cation of human 
errors (behavioral, contextual and conceptual) 
corresponding to three questions that one can 
ask about human errors (what? Where? How?). 
It is also inspired by Rasmussen's (Rasmussen 
and Jensen, 1974; Rasmussen, 1980), work on 
the cognitive functioning of man and Van Eslande 
(Van-Eslande, 2000) relating to typical accident 
scenarios. Focusing on the development of 
a potential accident and supported by some examples 
from the fi eld of railway safety, this method is 
based on three complementary levels of analysis of 
human error and uses the three levels suggested by 
Reason: contextual level (upstream of the accident), 
the cognitive conceptual level (during the accident), 
and the behavioral level (downstream of the accident). 
In practice, the analysis of the accident fi rst requires 
a comprehensive study of the environment and 
the work situation of human operators (upstream 
of the accident) and thus answers questions where? 
when? and who? (Type of operator involved). 
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Fig. 2. Example of classifi cation of potential errors caused by the train driver
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environment, with the other operators and with 
the system. This level of analysis therefore requires 
the study of the three main components of a socio-
technical system (Man, System, and Environment) 
as well as their interactions.
environment and in front of the system, this fi rst level 
of analysis makes it possible to determine the local 
factors triggering the error as well as the interactions 
between the internal and external circumstances. 
The purpose of this phase is to identify the different 
interactions that the man undergoes with his work 
Fig. 3. Example of classifi cation of potential errors caused by the operator at the CCP
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In this fi rst contextual and situational analysis 
of human error, it is also necessary to identify 
the main factors affecting human performance. 
These factors can, in fact, infl uence directly or 
indirectly, the cognitive process developed by 
the operator during his activity. The objective is to 
identify the physical, physiological, psychological, 
social, chronobiological, behavioral or professional 
factors that favor human error. The factors 
identifi ed in Tab. 1 are based on work in the fi eld 
of aviation safety and in particular the Circular 
of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO, 1993).To reach an exhaustive study, 
we supplemented the factors resulting from 
the circular of the ICAO by two other indispensable 
factors to the analyses: Chronobiological factors 
(Hadj-Mabrouk, 2016, 2017) and Factors related to 
psychosocial risks (Hadj-Mabrouk and Harguem, 
2014).
Unfortunately, whatever the skill and the know-
how of the Man, there are always errors because 
the human performance is intrinsically unreliable. 
The human operator generates errors even for simple 
tasks called "routine". As the complexity of the tasks 
increases, the associated error rate also increases 
a. The Human operator
At fi rst, it is a question of identifying the different 
types of operators involved as well as the factors 
that alter human performance. Human operators 
involved in the transport sector vary depending on 
the area. In the railway fi eld, for example, the actors 
are mainly maintenance personnel and operating 
personnel. Human operating errors include 
the operator at Centralized Command Post (CCP) 
and the driver. Potential operator errors in the CCP 
are often related to failure the berthing procedures, 
initialization, evacuation or driving procedures. 
The potential errors of the driving operator are 
generally divided into two major classes: non-
compliance with the signaling (crossing of 
the stop signal, non-compliance with the lights) 
and the error of control or maneuvering (untimely 
braking) or abrupt, non-compliance with the speed 
instruction, premature or untimely opening of 
the doors, etc.). Fig. 2 and 3 provide two examples 
of classifi cation of potential human errors caused 
respectively by the driving operator (train driver) 
and the CCP operator.
Tab. 1 Main factors affecting human performance
Physical factors
Sensory disabilities Motor disability
Vision Traumatic brain injury
Hearing Neurological conditions
Illusion
Physiological factors
Health
Nutrition
Sleep
Tired
Psychological factors
Personality: panic, stress
Mood
Emotional state
Behavioral factors
Lifestyle: night activities
Habits: alcohol, drugs, etc.
Boredom - distraction
Apprehension - trust
Panic - stress
Professional factors
Training
Knowledge
Experience
Sociological factors
Family issues
Bad social environment
Visitor, inspector, instructor
Team structure
Chronobiological factors
Circadian typology of sleep: morning / evening
Better performance times: morning / evening
Factors of decline of vigilance
Rhythmic fl uctuations of vigilance (circadian, 
ultradian)
Sleep disorders (sleep deprivation, sleep 
fragmentation, desynchronization)
Sleep pathologies (Narcolepsy, Sleep Apnea 
Syndrome)
Ingestion of alcohol
Psychotropic drugs (antidepressants, anxiolytics, 
etc.)
Factors related to psychosocial risks (PSR)
Work requirements
Emotional requirement
Autonomy and room for maneuver
Social relations and relationships at work
Confl icts of professional or personal values
Economic insecurity (uncontrolled change of task, 
confl ict, risk of losing one's job)
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These individual, professional and organizational 
factors are closely linked and interact together to 
infl uence human reliability. However, the interaction 
of all these factors can be complex and diffi cult to 
manage. It is therefore important to understand 
and effectively manage these performance factors 
by implementing well-targeted solutions to reduce 
the risk of human error and mitigate the severity 
of the consequences on the system, people and 
the environment. In addition, the management of 
these human factors should not be delegated to 
individual supervisors and a holistic organizational 
approach is essential to minimize potential risks and 
ensure the safety of the socio-technical system.
b. The system
At the system level, the list of potential human 
errors should be identifi ed for each type of equipment. 
The result of this study allows the designer to take 
into account, from the fi rst development phase of 
the system (project specifi cation), all the potential 
human errors relating to each category of equipment 
that are likely to compromise the overall safety 
of the system (Fig. 4). The goal is to integrate, 
right from the specifi cation and design phases of 
the system, the appropriate measures to catch, 
especially for complex tasks such as diagnosing 
critical situations. Although it is inevitable to avoid 
all risk situations, there are several factors that 
infl uence the error rate, positively or negatively. 
These factors, presented in Tab. 1, can be grouped 
into three broad categories:
- Individual factors that include personality, 
experience, competence, mood, mental and 
psychological ability, physical ability, and 
individual health factors such as fatigue, alertness, 
attention, stress, drugs and alcohol.
- Work factors that include the physical work 
environment, working conditions, confl icts of 
professional or personal values, autonomy and 
room for maneuver, the human-machine interface, 
the ergonomics of the workstation, the workload, 
the availability and quality of information and 
procedures, the equipment used, the requirements 
of the task.
- Organizational factors include organizational 
priorities, corporate culture, availability of 
resources, communication systems, social 
relations, workplace relationships, leadership 
behavior, performance indicators and economic 
insecurity such as the change of an uncontrolled 
task, the confl ict or the risk of losing one's job.
Fig. 4. Examples of human errors related to the types of equipment in the system
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fi nally Manual Free Driving with driving agent 
(e.g. driving error).
- The degraded modes of operation concern 
the manual driving in sight (e.g. non-respect of 
the spacing), the manual driving with Auxiliary 
Signaling (e.g. non-respect of a lateral signaling) 
and the driving in manual emergency mode (e.g. 
door control error and error on the departure of 
the train). Degraded modes of operation can 
provide operations such as berthing of trains or 
provisional services.
c. The environment
In addition to the human errors relating to human 
operators and the system, it is also necessary to 
identify the various environmental factors likely to 
infl uence the good progress of the human activity 
and in particular the execution of the prescribed task 
(e.g. supervision, monitoring, driving, diagnosis, 
etc.). There are two types of environmental hazards: 
internal hazards to work (environmental factors) 
and the external environment (meteorological 
factors) (Fig. 5). Identifying these environmental 
factors makes it possible to design and implement 
appropriate preventive ergonomic measures. Taking 
these factors into account as soon as the HMI system 
is designed guarantees a signifi cant reduction 
in human error during the operation of the system.
d. The interactions
Contextual analysis of potential human error 
should also focus on the different interaction 
factors between human operators, between 
humans and the system or between humans and 
their internal and external environment (Fig. 6). 
The analysis of the interactions between the operator 
tolerate, reduce or eliminate certain human errors. 
In the fi eld of rail transport, there are generally 
three types of equipment: so-called critical safety 
equipment, functional equipment that ensures 
the availability of the system and fi nally the monitoring 
equipment. The purpose of the safety equipment is to 
replace the operation and maintenance operators of 
the system or to facilitate the critical tasks entrusted 
to them. The control systems of emergency braking 
equipment, collision avoidance systems and speed 
setting systems are examples from the fi eld of rail 
transport. Monitoring equipment makes it possible 
to centralize information and better organize 
the actions of corrective or preventive interventions 
on the system. They contribute to improving 
the level of safety of the system but they do not 
prevent the occurrence of accidents or potential 
incidents. The dockside service monitoring and 
radio alert processing system are two examples 
of monitoring equipment. Functional equipment 
generally ensures the availability of the system. 
The train servo system and the train location system 
are two examples. Still in the context of the fi rst phase 
of contextual analysis (upstream of the accident) 
and in order to tend towards the completeness of 
the analysis, it is wise to examine and identify 
potential human errors related to each mode of driving 
the system. In the fi eld of rail transport safety, 
two main modes of exploitation are generally 
distinguished: nominal operating modes and 
degraded modes of exploitation.
- In the context of the nominal operating modes, 
we also distinguish several driving modes: 
the Automatic Driving without driver on board 
the train, the Driving in Automatic Control 
with driving agent (e.g. error control of doors 
and departure of the train), Controlled Manual 
Driving (e.g. traction errors, braking errors) and 
Fig. 5. The main environmental factors favoring human error
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Drawing on the different conceptual models of 
information processing, notably the works of 
Reason (Reason, 1990) of Rasmussen (Rasmussen, 
1980, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1990) and Rousse (Rouse, 
1983), Fig. 7 presents, through a simplifi ed model 
but which lends itself better to an industrial 
application, some examples of errors (from in 
the safety of rail transport) relating to the different 
stages of information processing or problem 
solving. Fig. 8 summarizes the model of Rasmussen 
(Rasmussen, 1982, 1987) and Reason (Reason, 
1990) and illustrates some examples of human 
error (from in the safety of rail transport) related to 
the human mode of operation based on skill, rules 
or knowledge. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the same potential error of the operator (for example: 
The driver does not control the braking system you 
at the sight of a target train; Remote unexpectedly 
sent by the operator of CCP; Untimely delivery 
of the high voltage on a section being evacuated; 
Switching error: Reception on occupied track or 
route by another vehicle) can be relative, not only 
to one or more functional steps of solving a problem 
in front of a problem situation (Fig. 7), but also to 
one or more levels of human functioning activities 
and the system allows the ergonomist designer 
to take into consideration the problems related 
to the characteristics of the work (load, position, 
schedules), to those of the prescribed task (number, 
duration, time, strength, knowledge ...) and those of 
the Human Machine Interface.
During the accident (cognitive analysis)
The second phase of analysis and evaluation 
of human error concerns the cognitive process 
involved during the accident (how?). In this context, 
the cognitive analysis of human error consists 
in studying the cognitive mechanisms involved 
in the production of the error at the origin of 
the accident. This analysis attempts to know how 
the cognitive process of the human operator, taking 
into account the contextual analysis (upstream), 
resulted in an erroneous action generating an 
accident. At this level, human errors can be classifi ed 
in two different and complementary ways: 1) either 
by referring to the three hierarchical levels of human 
activity (skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-
based) or 2) in the different stages of information 
processing human reasoning or decision-making. 
Fig. 6. Main interactions of the human operator
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maintenance operations or corrective measures that 
can be implemented just after the occurrence of 
a system failure due to human error. The object being 
of course to avoid resorting to corrective measures 
by putting more emphasis on preventive measures 
in order to reduce the level of risk inherent to human 
errors and consequently to tend towards a "good" 
acceptable level of safety for the environment, 
the system and the Man.
Results
This study proposed a methodological framework 
for the analysis, evaluation and classifi cation of 
human errors involved in railway accidents and 
incidents. It has identifi ed the various factors that 
favor the occurrence of human errors that could 
lead to unhealthy situations. These factors concern 
not only the inappropriate behavior of human 
operators involved in the safety and management 
of railway risks, but also the technical failures of 
the transport system as well as the alteration of 
environmental conditions. Particular emphasis has 
been placed on factors affecting human performance 
(Fig. 8). Indeed, the reality of the fi eld of dynamic 
systems proves that in the face of a critical situation, 
the whole cognitive process of the operator is 
solicited in a synchronous way and that it is very 
diffi cult to relate a human error to a precise and 
determined phase of the process reasoning.
Behavioral analysis (after the accident)
Behavioral analysis (after the accident) focuses on 
assessing the consequences of wrong action in terms 
of harm to humans, the environment and the system. 
Our study was deliberately limited to the fi rst two 
levels of human error analysis involved in the fi eld of 
guided or automated rail safety: contextual analysis 
(before the accident) and cognitive analysis (during 
the accident). The third level, which concerns only 
the analysis and the evaluation of the consequences 
caused by human errors, seeks to propose measures 
and safety barriers to minimize reduce or eliminate 
the risks involved. These are for example preventive 
measures that can be taken into account from 
the design phase of the system by the application of 
instructions and regulations strict during preventive 
Fig. 7. Examples of Human Error in Information Processing Steps
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and external) likely to infl uence the smooth running 
of human activity during the execution of the project 
an essential or critical task of safety. The proposed 
approach also takes into account the different 
interaction factors between the human operator, 
the system and its environment. Taking into account 
these interactions makes it possible, for example, 
for the ergonomics designer to take into account 
the problems related to the characteristics of 
the work (load, position, schedules), 
the characteristics relating to the prescribed task 
(number, duration, force, knowledge) and fi nally 
the characteristics related to the man-machine 
interface. This fi rst level of analysis, which deals with 
the study of the three main components of a socio 
technical system (man, system and environment), 
concerns the contextual analysis of human error and 
focuses on studying the different working conditions 
promoting the production of human error. This fi rst 
level of analysis thus makes it possible to determine 
the local factors at the origin of the error and also 
to identify the different interactions that the man 
such as physical, physiological, psychological, 
behavioral, occupational, sociological, chrono-
biological, and psychosocial risk factors. These 
individual, professional and organizational factors 
are closely linked and interact to infl uence human 
reliability. It is therefore important to understand 
and effectively manage these performance factors 
by implementing well-targeted solutions to reduce 
the risk of error. At the system level, the designer 
and the safety and human factors specialists must 
identify and imagine (from experience feedback) 
the potential human errors relating to each 
type of equipment and in particular the critical 
equipment such as the safety functions that manage 
the speed instructions. The result of this study allows 
the designer to incorporate, from the fi rst design 
phase of the project, the appropriate safety measures 
and barriers that can make up, reduce or eliminate 
the potential for errors. In addition to the human 
errors related to human operators and the technical 
failures related to the system, it is also necessary to 
identify the various environmental factors (internal 
Fig. 8. Examples of human errors related to the activity levels of the human operator
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data related to unhealthy situations. Its purpose is 
to take advantage of the lessons learned to improve 
the level of safety by implementing the appropriate 
preventive and corrective measures to avoid 
the reproduction of such a risk-bearing situation. 
However, in the majority of sectors and in particular 
the rail transport sector, the feedback of experience 
(Rex) faces several obstacles and in particular 
the formal and systematic failure to take into 
account human factors in the analysis and evaluation 
of surveys following an accident such as a collision 
or derailment of a rail transportation system. 
The "Rex" and generally limited to a purely technical 
dimension and yet, in almost all high-risk sectors, 
statistics show that human error is the basis in 70 to 
90% of cases of accidents or incidents. Admittedly, 
there are limits to human operators perceptually 
for the acquisition and processing of information 
and on the physical plane for the execution of 
the resulting actions. The variability of the skills 
of human operators (HO), the complexity of 
the transport system and the lack of fl exibility of 
the information system are all factors that increase 
the diffi culty of the tasks of supervision and action 
of the HOs. It is still a long way from the time when 
HOs would no longer play a role in the safety of rail 
transportation systems, and the risks would only 
come from errors in the design and implementation 
of systems. Indeed, the complexity and originality of 
the new transport systems give HOs a decisive role in 
the safety of train movements. The success of 
the human operator in accomplishing a driving task 
depends on several factors. It depends on, among 
other things, its perceptive and cognitive capacities, 
the validity of the various mental models that it 
has forged from the system, its psychological state, 
its workload, the complexity of driving situations 
and its state stress, for example in emergency 
situations where safety is threatened. Despite 
the advent of automation, the human operator 
remains the key element of the transport system 
and remains indispensable. Sometimes, its action is 
the only defense to prevent a failure of automation 
becomes an accident. The human operator is 
a paradoxical element: in a stress or fatigue situation, 
it can be an element of the loss of the reliability of 
a system. However, in certain critical situations of 
insecurity, it can be a factor of reliability, by restoring 
the good functioning of the system, sometimes by 
actions not envisaged by the regulation of safety of 
the exploitation but, related to his knowledge, his 
experience and his know-how; it then catches errors 
made by the designer. It is therefore necessary to 
optimize the place of the man in the transport system 
in full knowledge of his capacities but also of his 
limits. The selection and training of men is no longer 
undergoes with his working environment, with 
the other operators and with the system. The second 
phase of the proposed study focuses on the actual 
evaluation of human error and therefore concerns 
the cognitive process involved in the accident. 
In this context, the cognitive analysis of human 
error consists in studying the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in the production of the error at the origin of 
the accident. Taking into account the fi rst contextual 
analysis (upstream of the accident), the second level 
of the proposed method focuses on examining and 
understanding how the cognitive process of the human 
operator has led to an erroneous action contrary to 
safety may cause an accident or incident. Inspired 
in particular by the works of Reason, Rasmussen 
and the HFACS system, we have agreed to classify 
human errors in two different but complementary 
ways. The fi rst approach to classifying human 
error is based on the analysis of the different stages 
of information processing or problem solving 
(Perception / Interpretation, Analysis / Diagnosis, 
Planning / Decision and Execution / Action). 
The second approach to classifying the error refers to 
the three hierarchical levels of human activity (skill-
based, rule-based or knowledge-based). To show 
the feasibility and the merits of the proposed study, 
we used several examples of human error resulting 
from rail transport systems put into service in France. 
The proposed approach allows safety managers 
and railway accident and incident investigation 
agencies to identify weaknesses in the system and 
to implement targeted interventions, based on all 
of the above-mentioned data, which will reduce 
the probability of occurrence of railway accidents 
and incidents.
Conclusion
With the increasing complexity of industrial 
systems and especially guided or automated rail 
transport systems, considerable evolutions have 
taken place in the way of thinking and understanding 
the role and place of man in the safety of human-
machine systems. In this context, human factors play 
an important role in safety analyzes and especially 
after the occurrence of accidents (feedback of 
experience) that sometimes lead to human losses 
and the destruction of the environment and system 
equipment. It is therefore necessary to implement 
a process of feedback of experience (Rex) to 
memorize and capitalize all accidents and incidents 
and therefore avoid at least the reproduction of new 
accidents similar. The main purpose of the "Rex" is to 
analyze the circumstances leading to the realization 
of unintended adverse events. It is a dynamic 
process of collecting, storing, analyzing and using 
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- The second level of cognitive analysis (during 
the accident) aims to identify human errors related 
to the human cognitive process involved in a given 
situation of insecurity;
- The third level of behavioral analysis (after 
the accident) focuses on assessing 
the consequences of wrong action in terms of 
harm to humans, the environment and the system.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility and 
the validity of this new approach, we have used 
some real examples from the fi eld of railway 
safety and in particular the TGV-Nord high-speed 
system, the driverless metro type ALV (Automatic 
Light Vehicle), the Maggaly system from Lyon and 
the Transmanche Fixed Link system. In our opinion, 
the main contribution of this approach lies in 
the identifi cation of the main concepts relating to 
the human operator, to be taken into account as early 
as the data collection and analysis phase after an 
accident or a railway incident (experience feedback). 
This approach also makes it possible to specify, 
at each level of analysis, a list of potential human 
errors that contribute to the occurrence of railway 
accidents and that must be taken into account in 
the experience feedback (REX) to improve the level 
of safety of the new transport systems. Finally, this 
contribution makes it possible to respond European 
regulations and directives whose primary objective 
is to formally and systematically integrate human 
factors into railway safety analyzes. Nevertheless, 
this approach requires its implementation in other 
real industrial conditions, in order to validate and, 
if necessary, improve what remains a proposal.
suffi cient to achieve the expected performance. 
To achieve better controlled performance of 
the transport systems, it is necessary to design 
error-tolerant systems, to specify the contribution 
of HO in a system, to better organize and structure 
the feedback and to analyze the workload. It is also 
necessary to develop decision support tools, to 
develop systems whose functionalities give HOs 
fl exibility and adaptability, to understand HOs 
in nominal and degraded situations, to identify 
ways to improve the work situation in order to 
prevent negative consequences and favor positive 
consequences. In short, human factors must be 
integrated from the specifi cation of needs and 
the design of the system to design systems that 
adapt to HOs and not the opposite. In order to meet 
the requirements expressed by French and European 
rail safety regulations, and in order to comply with 
the harmonization measures recommended by 
the European Directive on the safety of 
the Community's railways, our contribution has 
been translated into the proposal of a global 
methodological approach to experience feedback 
(Rex) centered on the analysis of human error 
in the accident. Inspired in particular by the works of 
Reason and Rasmussen, the approach of analysis of 
human error that we have elaborated involves three 
levels of complementary analysis:
- The fi rst level of contextual analysis (before 
the accident) makes it possible to study the various 
factors favoring the production of the human error 
at the origin of the accident. These factors relate 
to the human operator, his work environment, 
the system and the various interactions of humans 
with the system and the environment;
References
Amalberti, R. 2001. Human error in perspective, Risks errors and failures: an interdisciplinary approach (Amalberti, 
R., Fuchs, C., Gilbert C.), Publications of the MSH-ALPES, 71-106. (In French)
Amalberti, R., Barriquault, C. 1999. Foundations and limits of experience feedback. Annals of Bridges and Roads, 
91: 67-75. (In French)
Cellier, J-M. 1990. Human error in the work, Human factors of reliability in complex systems (Leplat J. and De 
Terssac G.), Octares edition, 193-209. (In French)
ICAO, 1993. Circular No. 240-AN / 144. Human Factors: Investigating Human Factors in Accidents and Incidents, 
39-44. (In French)
De keyser, V. 1982. Human Reliability in Continuous Processes: Introductory Report, Mental Activities in Highly 
Automated Production Processes, 17th day of SELF, human work, 45 (2): 331-339. (In French)
Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European parliament and of the council of 11 may 2016 on railway safety.
Ergai, A., Cohen, T., de Sharp, J., Wiegmann, D., Gramopadhye, A., Shappell, S. 2016. Assessment of the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classifi cation System (HFACS): Intra-rater and inter-rater reliability, Safety Science, 82: 
393-398, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.09.028.
Fadier, E. 1994. The state of the art in the fi eld of human reliability, Ed Octares. (In French)
pp. 1 - 17, DOI 10.2478/tvsbses-2018-0007
Transactions of the VSB - Technical university of Ostrava
Safety Engineering Series, ISSN 1805-3238 
Vol. XIII, No. 2, 2018
16
Fu,G., Cao,J-L., Zhou, L., Xiang, Y-C. 2017. Comparative study of HFACS and the 24 Model accident causation 
models, Petroleum Science, 14 (3): 570-578, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12182-017-0171-4.
Gilbert, C. 2001. Experience feedback: the weight of constraints, Annales des mines, 1: 9-24. (In French)
Hadj-Mabrouk, H. 2016. Contribution of Human factors and chronobiology vigilance in public transport safety 
in France, Magazine on The Rail Industry of India, 1 (2): 49-52.
Hadj-Mabrouk, H. 2016. Machine learning from experience feedback on accidents in transport. Published in 7th 
International Conference on Sciences of Electronics, Technologies of Information and Telecommunications, 
246-251, DOI: 10.1109/SETIT.2016.7939874, Available at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7939874/.
Hadj-Mabrouk, H. 2016. Contribution of chronobiology vigilance in public transport safety. Journal of 
Multidisciplinary Research and Development, 3 (9): 214-221.
Hadj-Mabrouk, H. 2017. Impact of human errors and hypo-vigilance on transportation safety, International Journal 
of Research in Engineering and Technology (IJRET), 6 (1): 01-06, Available at: https://doi.org/10.15623/
ijret.2017.0601001.
Hadj-Mabrouk, H., Harguem, B. 2014. Psychosocial Risk Analysis and Assessment Method Based on Feedback 
from Experience, The Psychosocial Risks books, 23: 14-18. (In French)
Hadj-Mabrouk, A., Hadj-Mabrouk H. 2003. Approach of integration of human error in the feedback of experience. 
Application to the fi eld of rail transport safety, Ed Inrets/Lavoisier, 107. (In French)
Joing, M., Keravel, F. 1993. Experience feedback and analysis of the human factor. General Review of Railways, 
5-8. (In French)
Leplat, J. 1989. Human error in question: Cognitive analysis, psychopathological implications, Rev. de Méd. 
Psychosom, 20: 31-40. (In French)
Madigan, R., Golightly, D., Madders, R. 2016. Application of Human Factors Analysis and Classifi cation System 
(HFACS) to UK rail safety of the line incidents, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 97: 122-131, Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.08.023.
Norman, D.A. 1983. Design rules based on analyses of human error, communication of the ACM, 26 (4): 254-258. 
Punzet, L., Pignata, S., Rose, J. 2018. Error types and potential mitigation strategies in Signal Passed at Danger 
(SPAD) events in an Australian rail organization, Safety Science, 110 (Part B): 89-99, Available at: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ssci.2018.05.015.
Quatre, M. 1999. Experience feedback in severe land transport accidents, Annals of Bridges and Roads, 91: 17-22. 
(In French)
Rasmussen, J. 1987. The defi nition of Human Error and Taxonomy for technical system design, New Technology 
and Human Error (Rasmussen J., Duncan K. and Leplat J.), Wiley John & sons, 23-30.
Rasmussen, J. 1980. What can be learned from human error reports? in: Duncan K., Grunuberg M and Dallis D. 
(Eds), Changes in Working Life, (Wiley, Chichester), 97-113.
Rasmussen, J. 1982. Human errors: a taxonomy for describing human malfunction in industrial installations; 
Journal of Occupational Accidents, 4: 311-335.
Rasmussen, J. 1986. Information Processing and Human-machine Interaction: an approach to cognitive engineering, 
New York, North - Holland series in system science and engineering, 12, Ed. Sage A.P.
Rasmussen, J. 1990. The role of error in organizing behavior, Ergonomics, 33 (10/11): 1185-1199.
Reason, J. 1990. Human error. Cambridge University Press (New York, USA). ISBN 9780521314190.
Reinach, S., Viale, A. 2006. Application of a human error framework to conduct train accident/incident investigations, 
Accident Analysis & Prevention, 38 (2): 396-406, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2005.10.013.
Rouse, W.B., Rouse S.H. 1983. Analysis and classifi cation of human error, IEEE Transactions on systems, man 
and cybernetics, 13 (3): 539-549.
Salminen, S., Tallberg T. 1996. Human error in fatal and serious occupational accidents in Finland, Ergonomics, 
39 (7): 980-988.
SanKim, D., ChulYoon, W. 2013. An accident causation model for the railway industry: Application of the model 
to 80 rail accident investigation reports from the UK, Safety Science, 60: 57-68, Available at: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.06.010.
pp. 1 - 17, DOI 10.2478/tvsbses-2018-0007
Transactions of the VSB - Technical university of Ostrava
Safety Engineering Series, ISSN 1805-3238 
Vol. XIII, No. 2, 2018
17
Swain, A-D., Guttmann, H-E. 1983. Handbook of human-reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear power plant 
applications. Final report. United States. DOI: 10.2172/5752058.
Van-Eslande, P. 2000. Human error in accident scenarios: cause or consequence? The Transport Research Journal, 
66. (In French)
Wibaux, F. 1995. Feedback from experience: what lessons to draw from human errors. Aeronautical and Space 
Medicine Review, 136: 251-255. (In French)
Wiegmann, D., Shappell S. 2003. A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: The Human Factors 
Analysis and Classifi cation System, London, Routledge, ISBN 9781351962360, 184 pages.
Zhan, Q., Zheng, W., Zhao, B. 2017. A hybrid human and organizational analysis method for railway accidents 
based on HFACS-Railway Accidents (HFACS-RAs), Safety Science, 91: 232-250, Available at: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.017.
Zhou, J-L., Lei, Y. 2018. Paths between latent and active errors: Analysis of 407 railway accidents/incidents’ 
causes in China, Safety Science, 110 (Part B): 47-58, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2017.12.027.
pp. 1 - 17, DOI 10.2478/tvsbses-2018-0007
